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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
THE TYING CONTRACT AND ITS TREATMENT BY
THE FEDERAL COURTS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
One of the major evils which the anti-trust laws attempt to
alleviate is the illegal foreclosure of competition from markets
for goods and services. It is an economic axiom that barriers to
entry maintained by established competitors in a particular mar-
ket enable these firms (or a single firm) to market products at
a cost to the consumer substantially above that which the forces
of a truly open market would allow.' Market foreclosure is,
almost by definition, a highly efficient barrier to entry, and
because of the pernicious effect of this practice, it has been con-
sistently condemned by the federal judiciary,2 both under the
"restraint of trade" concept of the Sherman Act 3 and the sub-
stantial-lessening-of-competition criteria of the Clayton Act,4 the
two bulwarks of the anti-trust laws. This has been so even
where the foreclosure has not been complete. 5
Historically, one of the most effective market foreclosure
techniques has been the "tie-in," or "tying contract," defined as
"an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase the product
from another supplier."' It can be effective only where the
seller exerts sufficient economic influence over the market for
the first, or "tying" product to force buyers "to make a less than
optimal choice"' in the second, or "tied" product, thus insulating
it "from the competitive stresses of the open market."8 With
regard to competing sellers, the practice enhances the difficulty
of market entry, for the would-be competitors will be forced
"not only to match existing sellers of the tied product in price
1. See generally C. MCCONNELL, ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS, AND
POLICIES chs. 27-30 (4th ed. 1969).
2. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949); United
States v. American Linen Supply Co., 141 F. Supp. 105, 112 (N.D. Ill. 1956);
Standard Register Co. v. American Sales Book Co., 56 F. Supp. 475 (W.D.
N.Y. 1944), afl'd, 148 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 732 (1945);
Lord v. Radio Corp. of America, 35 F.2d 962 (D. Del. 1929), aff'd sub nom.,
Radio Corp. of America v. DeForest Radio Co., 47 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 847 (1931).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1963).
4. Id. §§ 12-27 (1963).
5. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962); Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
6. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
7. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 512
(1969) (dissenting opinion).
8. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953).
[Vol. 32
1971] COMMENTS
and quality, but to offset the attraction of the tying product
itself,"9 a practice at the most impossible and at the least "sig-
nificantly more expensive than simple entry into the tied mar-
ket."' 0
While the tie-in doctrine originated under the language of
section 3 of the Clayton Act," its major development has come
with the application to it of the more stringent standards of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.12 The latter was interjected for
two reasons, one practical, the other theoretical. On the one
hand, since section 3 of the Clayton Act applies only to "goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commod-
ities,' 3 it was deemed inapplicable in cases involving products
unspecified by the statute. 4 A more important consideration,
however, appears to have been the desire of the courts to apply
the Sherman Act concept of per se illegality to the tying con-
tract. Under section 1 of that act's "all embracing enumera-
tion," 5 the Supreme Court has recognized "certain agreements
or practices which, because of their pernicious effect on compe-
tition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively pre-
sumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elabo-
rate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the busi-
ness excuse for their use."' 6 Thus, having declared market fore-
closure to be an unreasonable per se practice, 7 it was inevitable
9. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 513(1969) (dissenting opinion).
10. Id.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1963): "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in
commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other
commodities whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States ... or fix a price charged therefor ... on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies,
or other commodities of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller,
where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract . . . may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
See also Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917).
12. Id. § 1: "Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, In restraint of trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal .. .
13. Id. § 14.
14. See Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495
(1969) (credit); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (land);
Advance Business Sys. & Supply v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (services).
15. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911).
16. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
17. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940), aff'd
mem., 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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for the Court to apply the same standard to one of the prime
market foreclosure techniques, the tie-in.'8 This has had the
advantage of allowing the federal courts to avoid the necessity of
the complicated and prolonged economic investigations 9 which
would be required under the Clayton Act mandate of proving a
substantial lessening of competition. 20 The result has been a gen-
eral merging of standards applicable under the two statutes,
with the conclusion being reached by some courts and commen-
tators that there is now no real distinction between them.
21
The Tying Contract
At this point some mention should be made of the tying
contract itself-both of what it is and what it is not. Although
most commonly appearing in written form, the federal courts
have held that it can also be implied, either from otherwise
acceptable wording in a contract,22 or from pressure sales tactics
18. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 394-96 (1947); Transparent-Wrap Mach.
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Carbice Corp. v. American
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1981); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965). See also United
States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 556 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
ajyfd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961). Mr. Justice Harlan observed that "[tit is
not . . . that under the Sherman Act the tying clause is illegal per se; the
per se illegality results from its use by virtue of a vendor's dominance over
the tying interest to foreclose competition from a substantial market in the
tied interest." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 14 (1958) (dis-
senting opinion). At least one writer, however, feels that "the Supreme
Court has always stopped short of according per se violation status to the
tie-in .... [T~heir conclusions have often involved somewhat extensive
market inquiry .... But at the same time it must be acknowledged that
the decisions do reflect a narrowing of the scope of the Court's examination
.... The conclusion to be drawn is that the judicial treatment of the tying
arrangement has reached the final stage before the practice becomes a
per se violation in the strict meaning of the term." Austin, Tying Arrange-
ment: A Critique and Some New Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 124-25.
19. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
20. See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 356-
57 (1922); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 309 F.
Supp., 1119, 1126 (E.D. Va. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 438 F.2d 248 (4th
Cir. 1971). Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 308, 314 (1949).
21. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 67
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970), citing Fortner Enterprises
v. United States Steel Corp. 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969). See also the dissenting
opinion by Justice Fortas, 394 U.S. at 521, stating that this position had been
reached by the court in Northern Pacific. But see Times-Picayune Publish-
ing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953) where the Court made an
attempt to differentiate the standards applicable under the Sherman and
Clayton acts, a position which Northern Pacific and Fortner have in effect
emasculated; accord, Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity-A Be-
appraisal, 29 OHio STATE L.J. 539, 545 (1968).
22. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970); McElhenny Co. v. Western
Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 338 (4th Cir. 1959).
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aimed at forcing substantial, though not necessarily all, pur-
chases from a certain source.28 The major victim of the latter
proscription has been the so-called "TBA" (tires-batteries-ac-
cessories) contract, involving an express or implied agreement
between a petroleum refiner and a manufacturer of tires, bat-
teries, and accessories which requires the former's distributor-
affiliate to purchase a specified minimum percentage of TBA
from the latter. Although this involves no direct contractual tie
between the distributor and the manufacturer, it has been held
to result in the same situation "as though" a tying contract ac-
tually existed.24
Unlike the considerations of implied tie-ins, a mere refusal
to sell has never been deemed by the courts as having by itself
the same overtones of illegality. This, however, is only a minor
example of what a tie-in is not.2 5 The most important aspect of
this consideration is the distinction between tying contracts,
exclusive dealing arangements, and requirements contracts.
Since the scope of this Comment encompasses only the former,
discussion of the latter two will only be by way of brief com-
parison and contrast.
The basic distinction between the tying contract and the
other two types of agreements is the "dual product nexus im-
posed by the vendor. '26 This distinguishes the tying contract
both "from exclusive dealing-where the vendee makes a total
commitment to marketing only the seller's goods-and the re-
quirements contract-where the vendee agrees to purchase his
total needs for a given item from the supplier. '27 Unlike the
tie-in, neither the exclusive dealing agreement 28 nor the require-
ments contract 29 are per se violative of the anti-trust laws.
23. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 370-71 (1965): Osborn v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961). Cf. FTC
v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM
Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
24. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 370-71 (1965).
25. McElhenny Co. v. Western Auto Supply Co., 269 F.2d 332, 337-38 (4th
Cir. 1959).
26. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 89.
27. Id.
28. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
29. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949); Anchor Serum
Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954). According to Standard Oil, "Erie-
quirements contracts ... may well be of economic advantage to buyers as
well as to sellers, and thus indirectly of advantage to the consuming public.
• . . Since these advantages of requirements contracts may often be suffi-




The early tie-in cases decided by the Supreme Court were
patent infringement suits brought by a seller against a buyer or
his supplier to enforce licensing restrictions which tied the sale
of non-patented supplies or equipment to the sale or lease of the
patented product. In Henry v. A. B. Dick Co.,30 the Court found
contributory patent infringement in a situation involving the
sale of ink to the purchaser of a patented rotary mimeograph
machine, where the license restriction attached to the machine
stated that it could only be used with ink supplied by the pat-
entee. The Court reasoned that there was no difference in prin-
ciple between a sale subject to specific restrictions of purpose,
time, or place of use, "and restrictions requiring a use only with
other things necessary to the use of the patented article pur-
chased from the patentee."8' The latter, like the former, was as
valid a limitation as the patentee's refusal to sell or permit the
use of the patented product.8 2 It took the rather naive position
that acceptance in the market place of the patented product on
the terms imposed would decide the efficacy of the tie-in,8 and
that sellers of the unpatented, tied product would be substan-
tially as free as ever to market their wares."
Five years later, the Court reversed its position with regard
to the patented tying product. Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co.85 was a patent infringement suit brought
by the assignee of the Edison motion picture projector patent
against the defendant film manufacturer and certain purchasers
of the Edison projector. There had been attached to each pro-
jector sold a plate bearing the restriction that the machine could
only be used to show the patented film manufactured by the
projector patentee or his assignee and that continued use of this
film once its patent had expired-thus presuming its availability
from other sources, such as defendant-would constitute patent
infringement. Plaintiff based his cause of action upon the Court's
tial amount of business affords a weaker basis for the inference that com-
petition may be lessened than would similar coverage by tying clauses,
especially where use of the latter is combined with market control of the
tying device." Id. at 307.
30. 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
31. Id. at 36.
32. Id. at 32.
33. Id. at 34.
34. Id. at 32.
35. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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decision in Henry, but Justice Clarke, for the majority, noted
that the explicit language of the Clayton Act36-which had been
passed in the interim to supplement the Sherman Act3T-was
in direct conflict with the Court's prior decision, and Henry was
accordingly overruled.3 8 He found the tendency to create mo-
nopoly in the manufacture and use of the film, as required by
the act, in the fact that the tying product, the projector, was
the only machine of its kind in current operation which per-
mitted repeated use of motion picture film without threat of
damage to the latter, and that 40,000 of the machines were in
use at that time.89
In invalidating the restriction, the Court also echoed the
language of Chief Justice White's vigorous dissent in Henry,
stating that such restrictions as these had the effect of extending
the scope of the legal monopoly granted by the patent laws to
cover the unpatented "tied" product.40 This realization, which
has been noted in virtually all subsequent cases involving agree-
ments tying unpatented supplies to patented items,41 resulted
in the recognition by the Court in Motion Picture Patents that
"[t]he scope of the grant... made to an inventor in a patent ...
must be limited to the invention described in the claims of his
patent. .. 42 and does not involve the materials with which or
on which it operated. 48
Working in the realm of section 3 of the Clayton Act, the
Court, following the decision in Motion Picture Patents, found
it necessary to couch its disapproval of the tying contract in
terms more harmonious with the language of the statute. It
was deemed appropriate that specific consideration be given to
36. Clayton Anti-Trust Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1963), refers to sales
or leases of "patented or unpatented" products whose effect "may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce."
37. Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355(1921). Cf. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 460 (1922).
38. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502,
518 (1917).
39. Id. at 508.
40. Id. at 516; Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 51 (1912) (dissenting
opinion).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948)
(copyright); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938) (patented
process); Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
(patented construction).





the extent of influence which the seller exerted over the market
for the tying product, which was usually a patented item. Thus,
the concept of "market dominance," the first in a series of gauges
of economic power, came into being. In United Shoe Machinery
Corp. v. United States,44 it was held that a seller, solely on the
basis of his dominant position in the shoe machine industry, had
violated section 3 of the Clayton Act by contracts tying the lease
of his patented machines to that of certain of his other machines
and products. Potential lessening of competition, a necessary
finding under section 3, was automatically inferred from the
seller's dominant position in the shoe machine industry. This
was held to be true despite the fact that specific agreements on
the part of the lessees not to use the machinery of competitors
were not present, the Court reasoning that the system of tying
restrictions was "quite as effective as express covenants could
be, '45 and practically compelled "the use of the lessor's ma-
chinery except upon risks which manufacturers would not will-
ingly incur."4
Market dominance as a factually demonstrable concept was
a viable standard as long as the applicable law relating to the
patent tie-in was section 3 of the Clayton Act, for it was clearly
amenable to relevant market criteria, the backbone of any sec-
tion 3 considerations. However, in 1947, the Court announced a
radical change of policy by holding, in International Salt Co. v.
United States,47 that it was a per s e violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act, as well as a violation of section 3 of the Clayton
Act, for the country's largest producer of industrial salt and
also the owner of patents on machines for the utilization of salt
products to require lessees of such machines to use only the cor-
poration's unpatented products in them.48 "Without factual in-
vestigation of the lessor's market, which was the crux of ille-
gality in the Shoe Machine decision, ' 49 the Court in International
Salt condemned the tying arrangement on two grounds. First,
it found that the volume of business affected by the contracts-
in at least one year amounting to one-half million dollars-
44. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
45. Id. at 458.
46. Id.
47. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
48. Id. at 394-96.
49. 1955 ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L COMM'N ANTITRUST REP. 140. See also Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305 (1949).
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could not be said to be "insignificant or insubstantial."5 Second,
in stating that the "[defendant's] patents confer a limited mo-
nopoly of the invention they reward," 51 the Court presumably,
but without explanation, inferred the equivalent of market domi-
nance from the patents themselves, 52 a position consistent with
some earlier cases which had drawn a presumption of the requi-
site economic power from the presence of a patented or copy-
righted tying product,58 but which was not compatible with rele-
vant market considerations.
The decision in International Salt was thus fraught with am-
biguities. Although clearly placing the tying contract, as a mar-
ket foreclosure device, under the per se illegality standard of
section 1 of the Sherman Act, it adopted unclear criteria that
must be met before the per se rule could be applied. Market
dominance based on relevant market considerations and demon-
strations of economic consequences were abandoned in favor of
a patent-inferred dominance concept, and a new standard was
announced which called for consideration of the concept only if
the volume of business affected was "not insignificant or insub-
stantial," terms which themselves were not defined in the
opinion.
Although the Court, in Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United
States,54 reverted to its old language of market dominance 55 and
considered comparative data56 to deal with a situation not in-
volving a patented tying product, its return to this quantitative
standard was short-lived. 7 Five years after Times-Picayune the
50. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
51. Id. at 395.
52. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
53. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Carbice
Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
54. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
55. Id. at 610.
56. Id. at 611.
57. In Times-Picayune, the Court held that contracts under which a
newspaper with a morning and evening edition-but having only an eve-
ning competitor-required advertisers to buy space in both editions were
not violative of the Sherman Act. In determining that, although the Inter-
national Salt criterion of a "not insubstantial" volume of trade in the tied
product (332 U.S. at 396) was met, the newspaper's position was not one of
dominance, it found the relevant market to be the general and classified
advertising of all New Orleans dailies. It reasoned that if the three papers
had competed equally for the advertising dollar, each would have accounted
for one-third of the market; thus, the actual forty percent of the total
attributed to the Times-Picayune, an increase of only six and two-thirds
19711
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decision in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States58 marked the in-
ception of the present approach to the tie-in problem. Citing its
ruling in International Salt as authority59 but giving that case
a somewhat strained reading, 60 the Court held that a railroad's
preferential routing provisions in its contracts for the sale and
lease of lands, by which the vendee or lessee agreed to ship over
the railroad's lines all commodities produced or manufactured
on the land (provided its rates were equal to those of competing
carriers) were tying contracts violative of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act. This decision had the effect of erasing any idea which
Times-Picayune may have implied that the Court was going to
treat non-patented products differently from patented ones.
The Court in Northern Pacific held that a tying contract was
unreasonable in and of itself whenever a party had "sufficient
economic power" with respect to the tying product to appreciably
restrain free competition in the tied product and a "not insub-
stantial" amount of interstate commerce was affected.61 It ruled
that the defendant possessed the sufficient economic power by
virtue of its extensive landholdings, and, without going into de-
tail,0 2 that the amount of interstate commerce affected met the
"not insubstantial" test. 8 It discounted any consideration of
market dominance, saying that to read the Times-Picayune case
so as to require such a standard "would be wholly out of accord
with the opinion's cogent analysis of the nature and baneful ef-
fects of tying arrangements and their incompatibility with the
policies underlying the Sherman Act. '0 4 The earlier decision, it
continued, had merely
"[m]ade an effort to restate the governing considerations in
this area as set forth in the prior cases, that the vice of tying
arrangements lies in the use of economic power in one mar-
ket to restrict competition on the merits in another, regard-
percent over the hypothetical division, did not amount to dominance. 345
U.S. at 612-13.
58. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 9; but see text at note 51 supra.
61. Id. at 6.
62. Id. at 16 n.3. The only statistics on dominance given in the lower
court's opinion were that in 1935-42 appellants' holdings of merchantable
timber in Montana, Idaho, and Washington was approximately five per-
cent of the total merchantible timber in those states.
63. Id. at 7.
64. Id. at 11.
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less of the source from which the power is derived and
whether the power takes the form of a monopoly or not."0' 5
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Harlan called for a return to
the Times-Picayune standard of determining per se illegality of
tying contracts, which he read as requiring "proof of market
dominance in the tying interest."66 He castigated the majority's
failure to show the defendant's dominant position in the relevant
land market6 7 and denied the existence of an analogy between
a patented tying product which could of itself confer the requi-
site economic power and the situation here involving parcels of
land whose uniqueness was questionable.0 8 The Court's at-
tempted equation of dominance with what he believed to be a
lesser standard of "sufficient economic power" would lead to
confusion in disposing of tying clauses under the Sherman Act. 9
Finally, he argued that to be effective, the new standard needed
to be based on a variety of factors not discussed by the majority
-the significant percentage control by the seller of the relevant
market, the desirability of the tied product to the purchaser, the
economic detriment likely to result to the vendee or lessee from
the existence of the tying clause, and the uniqueness of the tying
product.70
Present Approach
As has been previously described, the standards for deter-
mination of the illegality of the tying contract have evolved from
its treatment under the Motion Picture Patents case to the cri-
teria announced in Northern Pacific Ry., namely, that a tying
contract is unreasonable in and of itself whenever a party (1)
has "sufficient economic power" with respect to the tying product
to appreciably restrain free competition in the tied product, and
(2) a "not insubstantial" amount of interstate commerce is af-
fected.71 With regard to the latter criterion, first announced by
the Court in International Salt,72 there has been little contro-
versy. The standard has generally been recognized as a quan-
65. Id.
66. Id. at 17 (dissenting opinion).
67. Id. at 14 (dissenting opinion).
68. Id. at 18, 19 (dissenting opinion).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
72. 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947).
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titative one73 measured in terms of dollar volume so as to show
that more than a de minimis amount of commerce has been fore-
closed by the tie.7 4 To require more extensive economic data
would, according to one court, deny the per se illegality approach
and "would convert tie-in cases to 'rule of reason' cases with the
requirement of public injury. '75 Finally, the test is measured by
the total volume of sales tied by the policy under challenge and
is not, in a private anti-trust suit, limited to that portion of the
market in which plaintiff and defendant are in actual competi-
tion.7 6
The standard of sufficient economic power with respect to
the tying product has given the federal judiciary, as Justice
Harlan predicted in his dissenting opinion in Northern Pacific,
the most difficulty. Having effectively discarded any relevant
market considerations in its retreat from a market dominance
standard, the Court has been forced to find substitute pegs on
which to hang its determination of the presence of sufficient
economic power.
With regard to patented tying products, the difficulty has not
been too great. The earlier recognition that the patent or copy-
right itself conferred market dominance was easily assimilated
into the new, less stringent standard. The pre-Northern Pacific
decision by the Court in United States v. Paramount Pictures,77
which had termed "distinctiveness" as the key to market domi-
nance in a case involving copyrighted motion pictures, was fol-
lowed and more fully explained in its post-Northern Pacific rul-
ing in United States v. Loew's, Inc.78 Both cases involved the
attempted "blockbooking" of motion pictures, i.e., the offering for
license of one feature or group of features on the condition that
the exhibitor also license another feature or group of features
released by the distributor during a given period, thus prevent-
ing competitors from bidding for single features on their relative
73. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
74. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501
(1969).
75. Osborn v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 286 F.2d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1960), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961).
76. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502
(1969) ($2,300,000 annual sales of tied product not insubstantial); Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395 (1947) ($5,000 annual
sales); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 62-63
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) ($7,000,000 annual sales).
77. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
78. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
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merits.7 9 Both were held to be per se Sherman Act section 1
violations, the only distinction being that while Paramount Pic-
tures involved the distribution of films to exhibitors, Loew's con-
cerned their release to television stations.
The trademark has been recently added to the patent and
copyright as evincing the requisite uniqueness to warrant a
showing of sufficient economic power.8 0 Taken together, these
licensed monopolies cover a significant segment of the area in
which the tying contract would otherwise be a viable method of
forceful competition. Although per se illegality of tying contracts
based upon these three is the generally accepted judicial stan-
dard, one author considers this approach somewhat naive, at
least as far as patents are concerned, in view of such considera-
tions as competition between different patents in the same mar-
ket, the possible insignificance of the particular patent in the
overall makeup of the final product, and the chance that the
patented item is not invariably distinctive or unique on a mar-
ket-wide basis.81 He has drawn limited justification for his posi-
tion from Supreme Court dicta which calls for affording a patent
"at least prima facie evidence of [sufficient economic] control."82
However, it is the opinion of this writer that owing to the dis-
favor with which the federal judiciary views tying contracts in
general, 88 patents, trademarks, and copyrights will continue to
be viewed as providing of themselves the requisite economic
power to warrant findings of per se illegality when used as the
basis of tying contracts.
It is in the area of non-patented tying products that the prob-
lems entailed in following the "sufficient economic power" cri-
79. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-57 (1948).
80. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for cert
dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp.
847 (N.D. Calif. 1970).
81. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 112.
82. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
83. "[Tlying arrangements generally serve no legitimate business pur-
pose that cannot be achieved in some less restrictive way . . . .. Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969). "Tying
agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition.
• . . In the usual case, only the prospect of reducing competition would
persuade a seller to adopt such a contract, and only his control of the supply
of the tying device . . . could induce a buyer to enter one. . . . The exis-
tence of market control of the tying device, therefore, affords a strong
foundation for the presumption that it has been or probably will be used
to limit competition in the tied product also." Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 305, 306 (1949).
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terion, without resorting to relevant market data, have been the
most acute. It is submitted that in the only pertinent case to
reach the Supreme Court since its decision in Northern Pacific,
the Court has, true to Justice Harlan's warning, misconstrued
the basis of the per se illegality of the tie-in and placed itself on
dangerous footing from which to judge future tying contracts.
Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.8 4 was a private
anti-trust action under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
Plaintiff sought both treble damages and injunctive relief from
the alleged tying contract, by which he contended that defendant
was illegally forcing him to purchase prefabricated homes (the
tied product) in exchange for favorable credit terms from defen-
dant's wholly owned subsidiary (the tying product) to purchase
the land on which the houses were placed. 5 Plaintiff had been
willing to accept United States Steel's terms only because the
latter was the sole source which would provide one hundred per-
cent financing of his more than two million dollar investment;88
in exchange for this, however, he was forced to pay at least four
hundred dollars more per home than the price quoted by United
States Steel's competitors.8 7
In a five to four decision reversing the lower court,88 the ma-
jority mentioned the uniqueness of the credit terms offered by
the defendant,89 but rested its conclusion that plaintiff had raised
questions of fact which, if proven, would bring the tying agree-
ment within the scope of the per se90 doctrine on other grounds.
Specifically, it held that by proving acquiescence in the burden-
some terms by an appreciable number of customers,9 ' sufficient
economic power could be shown. The rationale was that "the
seller can exert some power over some of the buyers in the mar-
ket, even if his power is not complete over them and all other
buyers in the market."92 (Emphasis added.) This criterion is a far
84. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
85. Id. at 497.
86. Id. at 504.
87. Id.
88. Where there has been a full record which includes pre-trial depo-
sitions and answers to interrogatories, the Court has granted the motion
for summary judgment in tie-in cases. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Cf. United States v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 215 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. N.Y. 1963). But see the dissent by Justice Harlan
In Northern Pacific supra (356 U.S. at 13) for a disapproval of the procedure.
89. 394 U.S. at 505-06.
90. Id. at 500-01.
91. Id. at 504.
92. Id. at 503.
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cry from any concept of market dominance or monopolistic lev-
erage. The Fourth Circuit, in interpreting Fortner, has since
found this condition to exist with regard to a service contract in
which the company reserved the right to cancel its leases of
business machines if supplies other than its own were used in
them;93 a finding that at least twenty-five percent of the machine
owners and lessees in the particular market area had entered into
service contracts imposing the tying condition was held to pro-
vide the requisite "acquiescence by an appreciable number. '94
In one of the two dissenting opinions in Fortner, Justice
White, aside from questioning the efficacy of proscribing "the
sale of goods on easy credit terms as an illegal tie without proof
of market power in credit,"95 also questioned the basic assump-
tion of the new standard, namely that the buyers' acceptance of
the tie-in would "always suffice to prove market power in the
tying product.' 9 6 He, as well as Justice Fortas in the other dis-
sent, logically reasoned that the rationale of the majority's de-
cision could lead to the finding of illegal tying contracts merely
on the basis of favorable promotional considerations, 97 lower
prices, 98 or other ancillary attributes of the sale itself.9 9
At the very least, the decision in Fortner "casts great doubt
on credit financing by sellers."'1 More importantly, it represents
a complete departure from the Clayton Act standards on which
the per se illegality of the tie-in is based.101 It is submitted that,
in the sphere of the non-patented tying product, relevant market
determinations must be made to determine if the seller's or less-
or's provisions are dictated from a position of economic power or
are merely the evidence of customer willingness to accept a su-
perior product or service, in a competitive environment, on less
than favorable terms. The anti-trust laws, designed to protect
competition, should not be used by buyers as a mechanism to
protect themselves from bad business choices.
93. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp. 415 F.2d 55 (4th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
94. Id. at 69 n.13.
95. 394 U.S. at 511 (dissenting opinion).
96. Id. at 518 (dissenting opinion).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 523 (dissenting opinion).
99. Id. at 525 (dissenting opinion). According to Justice Fortas, these
so-called "ancillary" features include "delivery, installation, [and] supplying
fixtures .... "
100. Id. at 516 (dissenting opinion).
101. Id. at 523 (dissenting opinion).
1971]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Defenses to the Tying Contract
The Supreme Court has consistently affirmed the illegality
of tying agreements found to exist in the context of sufficient
economic power, without requiring elaborate inquiry into the
business excuse for their use.10 2 For this reason, the best defense
in a proceeding alleging the presence of a tie-in is for the defen-
dant to deny its very existence, either from the nature of the con-
tract itself or from its failure to meet the Northern Pacific stan-
dards, particularly with regard to showing a lack of sufficient
economic power over the tying product. 03 Of course, this has be-
come increasingly difficult since the Court's decision in Fortner,
and, at present, the only sure conclusion that can be reached is
that no inference of the requisite economic power can be drawn
from a single buyer's acceptance of the tie-in.104
Single Product Defense
The assertion that the tied and tying product in effect are
"functionally and physically . . . an indivisible piece of mer-
chandise"'10 5 is frequently put forward in an attempt to deny the
existence of a tying agreement. Although the original standard
announced by the Court in Times-Picayune was that "a second
distinct commodity"'1o was required, this has apparently been
relaxed by the decision in Northern Pacific, which spoke of a
tying contract requiring merely "separate and distinct''0 ° 7 tied
products. Although one lower federal court has said that this
later language did not overturn the earlier wording,0 8 at least
one appellate court appears to have taken the position that here,
as in other respects, Northern Pacific has effectively limited
Times-Picayune to its precise facts.0 9 This conclusion is further
102. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 61-52 (1962); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
103. 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
104. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 67
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
105. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 118.
106. 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).
107. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
108. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 619, 641 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), reVd on other grounds,
388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967).
109. Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 820 (1965), holding that a contract which forced a news-
paper to subscribe to all of a wire service's subject-differentiated wires in
order to get one of the services was a tying contract per se violative of § 1
of the Sherman Act.
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substantiated by the language in Fortner, where, despite vigorous
dissent and warnings of dire consequences for further customer
relations, 110 the single product defense was held inapplicable to
a credit transaction where the credit was provided by one cor-
poration on the condition that a product be purchased from a
wholly owned subsidiary of that corporation."'
At least one circuit, however, has taken a somewhat differ-
ent approach regarding the connection of the sale of electricity
with its distribution. In two recent cases courts of the Fourth
Circuit have, in one instance, likened distribution to a method
of delivery of the product to the consumer 12 and, in the other,
deemed it "an ancillary and necessary part of the business of
producing and selling electrical power."'3" In the latter case, the
Fourth Circuit, interpreting Fortner, added a new aspect to the
requirement of separate and distinct products by recognizing that
there be present separate markets as well, with the absence of
the latter strongly suggesting lack of the former. It found this
requirement to have been met in Fortner, where there was a
separate credit market, but held that there was no separate
market for the distribution of electricity without its sale." 4 Al-
though this test, if generally accepted, would undoubtedly soften
some of the criticism of the Fortner decision, it still awaits ap-
proval by the Supreme Court at the time of this writing.
A slightly different aspect of the single product defense is
the assertion that the tied product is actually a component part
of the tying commodity. Although this will be more fully dis-
cussed with relation to the defense that the tying contract serves
a "legitimate business purpose," 1 5 some initial observations
should be made at this point. While "it is apparent that . .. a
manufacturer cannot be forced to deal in the minimum product
that is ... usually sold .... [o]ne cannot circumvent the anti-
trust laws simply by claiming that he is selling a single prod-
uct.""" Thus, for example, merely because the goods purchased
eventually wind up as one product does not allow them to meet
110. Of. 394 U.S. at 525 (dissenting opinion).
111. Id. at 507.
112. Gas Co. of Columbia v. Georgia Power Co., 313 F. Supp. 860, 869
(M.D. Ga. 1970).
113. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d
248, 253 (4th Cir. 1971).
114. Id.
115. See text accompanying notes 120-30 infra.
116. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559
(E.D. Pa. 1960), afj'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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the single product test.1 1 7 With respect to this aspect of the single
product defense, one frequently cited decision has established
four criteria of separability, to wit:
"(1) Did competitors of the seller offer all the compo-
nents of the alleged 'product' separately and not exclusively
as a single package?
"(2) Was the number of components of the product vari-
able 'so that hardly any two versions . . . were the same?'
"(3) Was the purchaser charged for each component and
not a lump sum for the total product? and
"(4) Did the seller offer similar components for sale
separately?" l18
Legitimate Business Purpose Defense
One defense which has been used with some success has been
the showing that the admitted tying agreement served an other-
wise "legitimate business purpose,""19 which the courts have held
refutes a finding of the presence of sufficient economic power.120
The legitimate purposes accepted have been of two types: to
protect the seller's goodwill through prevention of the use of
inferior products with his equipment that could impair its ef-
ficiency, and to protect a new product or industry.12'
Although the goodwill defense has been asserted successfully
in the lower courts,' 22 its only acceptance by the Supreme Court
has been in a case in which it was combined with two other de-
fenses.128 Generally, the courts hold that the publication of speci-
fications for products to be used in conjunction with the seller's
117. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 513 (2d Cir. 1964), petition for
cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
118. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount
Theatres, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 619, 642-43 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), rev'd on other
grounds, 388 F.2d 272 (2d Cir. 1967), citing United States v. Jerrold Elec-
tronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S.
567 (1961).
119. Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 467-69 (1st Cir. 1962).
120. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 68
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970). Cf. Fortner Enterprises v.
United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 504 (1969).
121. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 68
(4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
122. Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (1st Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 931 (1961); Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp.,
80 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1935). Of. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 512 (2d
Cir. 1964), petition for cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965).
123. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
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or lessor's equipment will adequately protect it and his goodwill
from damage, and they will deny the use of the restrictive tie. 24
According to the Supreme Court, "the only situation . . . in
which the protection of goodwill may necessitate the use of tying
clauses is where specifications for a substitute would be so de-
tailed that they could not practically be supplied,"' 25 a situation
which no case has as yet squarely presented.
Successful use of the defense that a legitimate business pur-
pose is served by the tying agreement, in that it merely protects
a new product or industry, can be made "only in the early stages
of introducing and exposing the product to the public when its
newness precludes the existence of competing items.' 26 The
leading case on this point is United States v. Jerrold Electronics
Corp.,12' where defendant, the developer of the first workable
community antenna system, was able to show that his company's
policy of selling only on a full system basis with exclusive parts
and service conditions, was, given the state of the art and the
need for technical guidance, a reasonable restraint not violative
of the anti-trust laws. However, while allowable at the incep-
tion of the business, it neither continued to be reasonable
throughout its period of use128 nor did its approval extend to
expansion of original facilities. 129
Other Defenses
Other attempted defenses to an illegal tying contract have
become noteworthy more for their general failure rather than
for any success. One exception has been the courts' acceptance
of the defense of partial market foreclosure, where the tie-in,
though affected, leaves the tied purchaser free to buy the same
124. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1947);
Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 851 (N.D. Calif. 1970). Of.
Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962) for an in-
stance where a dealer was furnished specifications and told he could buy
from whomever he wished as long as the specifications were met.
125. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1948). For sup-
port of this position, see 1955 AT'y GEN. NAT'L CoMM'N ANTITRUsT REP. 145.
126. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 119.
127. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
128. Id. at 558. See also Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847,
851 (N.D. Calif. 1970) (new business defense to per se tying contract not
applicable where business begun in 1952 and purchase requirements re-
mained in effect from 1963 to 1970); General Talking Pictures Corp v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 18 F. Supp. 650, 666 (D. Del. 1937).
129. 187 F. Supp. 545, 561-62 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567
(1961).
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product from other sources. 130 Also, it has been suggested, but
never held, that a tie-in might be acceptable when employed by
a small company attempting to break into a market.' 3 '
Defenses which have been flatly rejected by the courts have
included allegations that business expediency necessitated the
practice ;182 that it provided an expected and normal service to
customers; 18 that it was justified as an accounting device to com-
pensate for a trademark license;8 4 that the injured party could
pass the increased cost brought about by the tying contract onto
his customers;185 and that the customer could purchase the tied
product in the open market if it could do so at a price lower than
-but not equal to-the contract price.3 6
Perhaps the least successful defense to the tie-in has been
the allegation that lenient enforcement of the contract denies its
illegality.'-" The courts have consistently noted that the power
to foreclose is always present 8s and that laxity in enforcement
in no way eliminates the contract's restrictive effect on compe-
tition. 89
Conclusion
In most respects, the standards which have evolved by which
the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, judge tying
130. See, e.g., FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923); Miller Motors
v. Ford Motor Co., 252 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1958). But see Signode Steel Strap-
ping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1942), where the court denied the
defense where it was argued that tying steel strapping wire to leased ma-
chinery did not completely foreclose competition since the machines were
inexpensive and could be easily purchased from other sources, the court
reasoning that, as a practical matter, it would be unrealistic to expect a
firm to purchase two machines to accomplish the same task.
131. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330 (1962). See also
Note, 18 STAx. L. REV. 457 (1966).
132. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 51 (1962); Baker v. Sim-
mons Co., 307 F.2d 458, 468 (1st Cir. 1962).
133. Signode Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 53 (4th Cir. 1942).
134. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D. Calif.
1970).
135. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
136. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1947).
137. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 88, 121.
138. United Shoe Mach. Co. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 458 (1922);
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 18 F. Supp. 650,
666 (D. Del. 1937).
139. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Advance Business Sys. &
Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 64 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 920 (1970).
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agreements have been both consistent with regard to the duty
imposed upon the judiciary by the anti-trust laws to foster com-
petition and warranted in their severity owing to the scant jus-
tification for the existence of this powerful market foreclosure
device in a free economy. 140 The "not insubstantial" test is un-
doubtedly a proper gauge of the economic impact of the tied
product in the open market. Also, with regard to a patented
tying product, its own uniqueness, coupled with its monopoly-
by-license, should allow it to fall of its own weight into the "suf-
ficient economic power" criterion.
It is submitted, however, that with respect to the non-
patented tying product, the courts, led by the Supreme Court,
have strayed from the principles underlying the illegality of
the tying agreement, so as to relieve the Sherman Act pro-
scription of its Clayton Act basis. This writer does not see how,
in this instance, the Court cannot avoid modifying its present
approach by allowing relevant market considerations to come
into play. Without such modification the idea of basing a find-
ing of sufficient economic power on the acceptance of a tie
by a yet undefined "appreciable number" of buyers is a hollow
standard. It does not take into consideration the power of the
seller, evidenced by his market position, to enforce the tie
through the absence of sufficient buyer alternatives, as opposed
to the fact that, even with the tying agreement, the buyer may
be receiving a "better deal" than is available from comparable
sources. As was stated earlier, the Court should be seen not as an
organ for protecting bad business judgment, but rather for foster-
ing competition under the anti-trust laws.
If this new approach would cause some modification of
per se illegality as applied to these particular contracts, it is
submitted that the Court should not hesitate to modify this
method of consideration. It is basically a procedural tool, and it
should not be used merely as a time-saving device when its
effect is to thwart the workings of justice. This is particularly
true when seen in light of the fact that once a tie-in has been
established and the requisite product leverage found, the pres-
ently evidenced tightening of standards, combined with a strict
application of the per se rule, may preclude the success of any
140. See Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 847, 850 (N.D.
Calif. 1970).
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defense to the alleged illegality; 141 it thus may be necessary to be





AVOIDING THE ZERO BASIS
The usufruct is a commonly occurring Louisiana property
right, primarily due to the effect of article 916 of the Louisiana
Civil Code,' which establishes, in the case of an intestate dece-
dent, a usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse on the dece-
dent's share of the community property. Because the usufruct
is created frequently and since recent amendments to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954 have increased the possibility that the
usufructuary will be exposed to income tax liability, it is impor-
tant that such amendments and their effect be reviewed. Section
1001 (e) 2 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,8 which was en-
acted by section 516 (a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 4 provides
in part that the basis for determining gain or loss on a term
141. Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New
Thoughts, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 122-23.
142. United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), afj'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961). The leading case on tie-in de-
fenses, required three: goodwill, single product, and new product.
1. LA. Civ. CODE art. 916: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband or
wife shall have left issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall not
have disposed by last will and testament, of his or her share in the com-
munity property, the survivor shall hold a [in] usufruct, during his or her
natural life, so much of the share of the deceased in such community prop-
erty as may be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall cease, however,
whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage."
2. "See. 1001(e) CERTAIN TERM INTERESTS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In determining gain or loss from the sale or other dis-
position of a term interest in property, that portion of the adjusted basis
of such interest which is determined pursuant to section 1014 or 1015 (to
the extent that such adjusted basis is a portion of the entire adjusted basis
of the property) shall be disregarded.
"(2) TERM INTEREST IN PROPERTY DEFINED.-For purposes of paragraph (1), the
term 'term interest in property' means-
(A) a life interest in property,
(B) an interest in property for a term of years, or
(C) an income interest in a trust.
"(3) ExcEPTiN.-Paragraph (1) shall not apply to a sale or other disposition
which is a part of a transaction in which the entire interest in property is
transferred to any person or persons." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1001(e), en-
acted by H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 516(a) (1969).
3. All references to section numbers are to the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 unless otherwise specified.
4. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
